A decision model including perceptual noise or inconsistency i s developed from expected value theory to evaluate driver stop and go decisions a t signaled intersections.
. Introduction
One of the motivations for developing the driver decision model described here was t o measure and analyze the behavior of alcohol-impaired drivers.
W e d e s i r e d t o s e p a r a t e r i s k taking i n t o components of r i s k p e r c e p t i o n and acceptance.
If a d r i v e r takes increased risks, i s it because he perceived t h e r i s k and decided t o accept it or because he does not perceive the increased risk? Expected value theory provides a simple construct for making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and has been applied in the past to describe impaired driver behavior (References 1,
2, and 3 ) .
Here we apply a Subjective Expected Value (SEV) model to explain driver stopping and going behavior at signaled intersections. Perceptual noise i s included t o r e f l e c t one type of driver inconsist e n c y i n t h e decision-making process (Ref.
) .
Although measures were taken throughout a t y p i c a l drive-home scenario in volume several control tasks, we concentrate here on signal light behavior. 13766 South Hawthorne Boulevard Hawthorne, C a l i f o r n i a 90250 control behavior as i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g . 1 . Perceptions of vehicle velocity and d i s t a n c e t o t h e s i g n a l a t the time the light changes to amber a r e u s e d t o form a subjective estimate of the probabilities of success and f a i l u r e f o r t h e v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s . These s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e s t o c h a s t i c i n nature. They are weighted with appropriate utilit i e s o r values and t h e d r i v e r s e l e c t s t h e a l t e rnative with the highest expected value.
W e define Subjective Expected Values (SEVs) f o r t h e two a l t e r n a t i v e s , go o r stop, respectively:
where SP(. ) and V(. ) are conditional subjective p r o b a b i l i t i e s and values, respectively.
From these equations and the several other simplifying assumpt i o n s , we can express the probability that a driver w i l l attempt t o go through the signal light. Further simplifying notation s o t h a t F = F a i l and G = G o , the probability of Going i s :
Region where the region i s defined by:
With the assumptions listed in Table   1 , it can be shown (see Ref. 6 
f o r d e r i v a t i o n ) t h a t t p e P(G)
is the Gaussian integral:
These concepts are illustrated in Fig.  2 . Repeated observations for a given situation, e.g., s i g n a l s with the same time t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , r e s u l t i n a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e s t i m a t e s i l l u s t r a t e d 
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Operator selects decision alternative with largest subjective expected value, Values r e f l e c t u t i l i t i e s and are constant.
Subjective probabilities are mutually exclusive and exhaustive .
Subjective probabilities are Gaussian random v a r i a b l e s i n t h e r e g i o n o f i n t e r e s t .
Increased SP(F/G) decreases P( G), i.e., the values discourage go-failures.
The verbal estimates of SP(F/G) l i n e a r l y r e f l e c t subjective perception.
The threshold value of SP(F/G), below which t h e operator selects the go alternative i s SPc(F/G): by the top probability density curve. Assuming a cutoff subjective probability, SPc(F/G) , as illustrated, the area under the density c w e and to the left of the criterion is P(G). This is illustrated in the bottom of Fig. 2 , where the relationship of P(G) a c a m c t i o n of the average subjective estimate, SP(F/G), is illustrated. The slope of this relationship is determined by the variability of the subjective estimates, asp. Note that the effect of increasing the variance of the subjective estimates is to increase P(G) for the case illustrated. Also shown is the consequence of a change in the driver's risk acceptance, SPc(F/G).
A useful empirical relationship is also apparent in Fig. 2 . Evaluation of Eq. 5 for the condition SP~(F/G) = Z(F/G) results in P(G) = 0.5. ~hus, the subjective cutoff SPc(F/G) can be determined empirically from ob jectiveLehavior probabilities by selecting the value of SP(F/G) at P(G) = 0.5.
. The Experiments
The signal light task was simlated in both a fixed-base simulator and instrumented vehicle on a closed course (see Ref. 7). The signal light timing was controlled similarly in both simulation and field studies. When the vehicle approached the intersection, the signal light initially turned green. At a random-appearing time later, the signal turned amber. This time was controlled by a circuit which compensated for car speed such that the time interval to the intersection was the same for a given intersection timing, regardless of the approach speed, if the driver maintained that speed. The amber light interval was fixed at 3 seconds, following which the light turned red. Thus, the probability for successfully making a light was controlled without placing an artificial speed restriction on the subject. Five signal timings were automatically commanded. One was set to require a sure stop (early yellow) and another a sure go (long green). The remaining three timings ranged from a probable stop to a probable go. The times to the intersection from the amber light typically ranged from 2.0 to 3.5 seconds. (The kinematics of stopping or going for these timings are discussed more fully in Ref. 8 .)
The subjects were instructed to behave as they normally would in a driving situation with a reasonable motivation for timely progress and a desire to avoid tickets and accidents. Also, a monetary incentive structure was provided as a tangible and quantifiable motivation for performance (see Ref.
9 ) .
Subjects were trained until objective performance and subjective estimates were consistent in the view of the experimenter. They then completed trials on each of two days. During an alcohol day, the trials corresponded to an across-subject average blood alcohol concentration ( M C ) of 0.00 (baseline) , 0.10 (ascending -when measured), 0.14 (peak) , and 0.10 (descending). During the placebo day, the trials were given at approximately the same time of the day as for the above trials. The day order was counterbalanced among subjects.
Objective and subjective measures were taken, and the number of stop and go decisions was recorded. The number of failures and successes for each decision was detected automatically and recorded irrespective of whether or qot the driver received a ticket. Corresponding subjective estimates were recorded during the run. Subjects were asked to give their estimate of failure on a scale of 0 to 100 percent immediately following randomly selected intersections. Nominally, six of each type of intersection were selected. Intersections for which the driver received a ticket were ignored.
Some Results
In Fig. 3 the objective probabilities of going, P(G), and failing given a go, P(F/G), for both the simlation and field test are compared to determine driver risk-taking behavior. 'Ihe probabilities were computed by dividing the total number of outcomes by the total number of opportunities (e.g., P(F/G) = Number of go failures/Number of go's). For example, Intersection 2 in the simlation resulted in the subjects always going, P(G) = 1 , and the timing was such as to preclude go failures, P(F/G) = 0. The timing was a l s o adequate on Intersection 3 to allow safe go's; however, in this case the drivers did not always go, i.e., P(G) 0.75. This behavior was not sensitive to alcohol, and the subjects appear to have been behaving conservatively on Intersection 3 . Subjects did not go very frequently on Intersection 4 and had a high failure rate when they did. There is an indication of increased go behavior under alcohol for 1nter.section 4. This is also apparent for the intersections in the field test.
Part of the reason for this increased going behavior on some intersection timing in spite of increased failures is illustrated in Fig. 4 . Here we note that the variability of the subjective risk perception, asp, &creases although the average perception of risk, SP(F/G), remains relatively constant. Considering a typical switching criterion, as shown in Fig. 4 , we see that the increased variability of risk perception with increased alcohol leads to a greater percentage of subjective estimates below this criterion. The justification for this interpretation was validated via statistical analysis of parameters for the proposed model.
Model Evaluation
The decision-making model discussed above was used to analyze driver risk acceptance behavior. This was accomplished in three steps. First, driver risk acceptance thresholds, SPc(F/G) , were computed for each experimental treatment. Then the threshold data were analyzed to investigate changes under intoxication. Finally, the various risk perception data were combined according to Eq. 5 and resulting compute5 or estimated values of the probability of going, P(G) , were compared with actual P(G) data to establish model validity. (Fig. 5) . A trigonometric function was used to approximate the risk acceptance f'unction for a linear regression fit to P(G) and SP(F/G) data:
The SPc(F/G) were computed and analyzed with no indication of alcohol effects on driver risk acceptance. The SPc and SP(F/G) data were then used to compute probability of go estimates, ?(G), according to Eq. 5. These compared favorably as shown in Fig. 6 and analysis of covariance procedures indicated that P(G) was highly correlated with the computed estimate P(G) (Ref.
) .
These results suggest that the alcohol effects -on the drivers' subjective risk perception, both SP(F/G) and osp, are responsible for drivers increased going behavior while intoxicated. They also validate the usefulness of the model in analyzing that behavior. Also, note the similarity of the results for both the simulation and the field study.
There are other possible interpretations of these results. An intuitive one is that the variations in subjective estimates are due to variations in the time of the decision and not to variations in perception for a given time and distance relation. However, a preliminary analysis of the time histories for several of the subjects indicated that the response times did not change significantly under alcohol, Ref. 7. In addition, there are other models which could be applied to the observed signal light behavior. A potentially fruitful approach is the signal detection model as developed by Green and Swets, Ref. Other types of criteria suggested in these works, such as likelihood ratio threshold and Newman-Pearson strategy, may be applicable.
However, it is apparent from Fig. 6 that the additional refining assumptions used in these models may not be necessary for interpreting the major effects of alcohol on decision behavior. 
Previous Research
While increasing frequency of driving decision errors with increased BAC has been found by other researchers, the interpretation of which behavior component i s p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s i n c r e a s e has been inconsistent.
Comparison between s t u d i e s i s confounded because of differences in tasks, reward and penalty conditions, alcohol treatment methods, and a n a l y t i c a l approaches.
In agreement with our results, four o f t h e f i v e other studies commented on here found increased risk taking with increased alcohol intake.
Cohen, Dearnaley, and Hansel, Ref.
1 , in evaluating bus drivers' willingness to drive through a conedelineated gap found the number of attempts increased with alcohol intake.
L e w i s and Sarlanis, 
13, a l s o
found an increased number of attempted passes i n a simulated overtaking and passing task. Finally, Ellingstad, McFarling, and S t r u c h a n , Ref. 14, i n evaluating performance on laboratory analogs of automotive passing tasks with multiple discriminant analysis, found the discriminant "riskiness/ indecisiveness" increased with alcohol. This discriminant included a positive loading on passing attempts. The only exception to this trend was presented by Snapper and Edwards, Ref.
2, who found no significant change with BAC in the number of attempted lane changes through a given gap size on their closed course.
The interpretation of these data as resulting from changes in psychomotor skill, perceptual ability, or cognitive risk acceptance varies between authors. Re-analysis is difficult because only two of these studies took sufficient measures to delineate changes in decision strategies. Cohen, et al., Ref. 1 , asked the bus drivers to indicate levels of confidence expressed as the number of times out of five the driver thought he could succeed in driving through the different size gaps. The estimates did not change significantly on the average for the narrowest accepted gap; however, the accepted gap size decreased with increased alcohol intake. Therefore, he assumed "If the difficulty of the task remained unchanged, they became more optimistic and attached a higher subjective probability to the task." The variances in the estimates were not reported. Cohen concluded that the primary effects of alcohol were to decrease psychomotor skill and deteriorate "judgment," where we interpret judgment to include mean perception. Snapper and Edwards, on the other hand, asked their subjects for subjective probabilities and found no significant change in the mean for a given gap size. As they found no change in the mean subjective estimates and no increased risk taking, but with increased failures in execution, they concluded that the primary effect of increasing BAC was degraded psychomotor skill. Again, no data on the effects of BAC on the consistency or variability of the subjective probabilities were presented.
By comparison, our findings agree with most of these results but not with the authors' interpretations. As in most of these studies, we found increased risk taking and no change in risk acceptance, i.e., no change in the mean subjective estimate for a given intersection. However, our data suggest that increased risk taking is primarily due to increased variance or inconsistency in perceptual estimates. This interpretation could also explain the results found by the first four authors mentioned above if data on mean and variances of subjective estimates were available. The disparity between this conclusion and Snapper and Edwards' conclusion may be due to at least two factors. Their lane change task placed more emphasis on psychomotor execution than does the current signal light task; hence their results may have been more sensitive to this type of degradation. In fact, we found considerable degradation in the consistency of psychomotor performance in the other tasks in our driving scenario (Ref. 7 ) . In addition, a fundamental difference between our simulated driving tasks and those of both of the previous studies using subjective estimates is addition of temporal pressure. Our subjects were required to form their estimates in "real time" as opposed to the "stop action" type of judgments and driving scenarios used in previous studies.
In summary of previous decision-making studies, those aspects of our results which are directly comparable with previous research largely agree with those findings. Risk taking generally increased with increasing BAC. Interpretation of previous work beyond this point is difficult because of insufficient measures. However, that work does not disagree with the current conclusion that there is no change in risk acceptance. Our interpretation of these results, that perceptual distor--tion is a primary cause of alcohol-induced incre risk taking Observed for simple tasks, is new.
Conclusions and Recommendations
An expected value model accounted for the effects of perceptual noise on decisions for drivers in a simulated signal light task. With this model, analysis of the significant changes in behavior for increasing BAC indicated no changes in risk acceptance; that is, subjects did not change their subjective criterion level. The primary cause of the increased risk taking found for intersections timed with a low probability of success was increased inconsistency or variance in their subjective perceptual estimates.
These results have ramifications both for researchers in this field and those attempting to apply the results. In future human decision-making work, measures of inconsistency in perception should be given as much attention as measures of central tendency. Also swested by these results is that one method.of reducing drinking driver errors may be to improve the driver's perceptual environment to decrease his inconsistency. We could expect these results to generalize the effects of alcohol on other such real-time decision tasks as aircraft and spacecraft control. In addition, the analytical framework used here may be useful in evaluating the effects of other d r u g s and stressors on human decision behavior. 
